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Abstract 
 
Due to the dynamic nature of human conflict, non-traditional terror tactics have evolved to 
undermine the socioeconomic stability of targeted societies. Considering the landscape in which 
terrorists operate, emphasis on more subversive methods of biological terror have become 
prominent in recent decades. Agroterrorism, or the use of plant pathogens to infect a nation’s 
cultivated crops, is an emerging topic due to its threat to global food security and economic 
stability. Although emergency preparedness objectives have been enacted at national, state, and 
even local levels, preemptive measures can no longer remain the sole responsibility of 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The agricultural and scientific communities are 
responsible for collaboration to improve security and pioneer new methods of disease resistance 
in susceptible crops. Plant immunology is an expanding field which explores the molecular 
defense mechanisms innately present within the plant kingdom and provides insight concerning 
novel methods of boosting the immunity of susceptible crops to existing and emerging 
pathogenic agents. This thesis serves to define the threat of agroterrorism from a national 
security and scientific perspective, identify notable plant pathogens, provide a brief survey of 
plant immunology, and discuss topics which can aid scientists, policymakers, and growers in 
efforts to secure the global food supply from those who would cause harm. 
Keywords: terrorism, agroterrorism, biosecurity, agriculture, plant immunology  
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The Growing Threat of Agroterrorism and Strategies for Agricultural Defense 
Following the attacks of September 11 and the anthrax scare of late 2001, non-state 
actors with the ability to wield unconventional weapons emerged as a primary force within the 
realm of international security. The use of biological agents to induce public panic is an ancient 
tactic which garnered particular attention during the post 9/11 era in accordance with rapid 
advancements in biotechnology. While the threat of bioterrorism has been recognized and 
addressed by public health and law enforcement agencies, the majority of research and 
emergency preparedness centers on the immediate threat posed by direct infection of human 
targets rather than the various indirect methods of bioviolence available to radical groups.  
Crop production provides a particularly susceptible target for bioterrorism, as both world 
powers and developing nations depend upon agricultural development for revenue and 
sustainment. Numerous scenarios exist detailing the socioeconomic consequences of a direct 
biological attack, yet threat assessment for the agricultural industry has often failed to reflect the 
degree of risk. Heightened awareness of the potential for agroterrorism is vital for the 
implementation of prevention measures, as such success depends upon the practices of individual 
growers, companies, and scientists. The goal of this thesis is to promote a greater understanding 
of the indirect threats posed by a lesser-publicized form of bioterrorism and provide suggestions 
for preventative measures which may be taken by both the agricultural and scientific 
communities to defend a nation’s cultivated crops against the targeted use of plant pathogens. 
Defining Agroterrorism 
Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of a toxic or pathogenic agent into livestock, 
crops, or the water supply in order to cause disease, mortality, economic loss, and social 
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upheaval (Gill, 2015 and Green et al., 2017). Such attacks typically grow out of unresolved 
social, political, economic, or religious contradictions (Alekseeva et al., 2017) and remain the 
fascination of state and non-state actors (Jaspal and Khan, 2017). The use of bacterial, viral, 
fungal, or toxic agents to infect plants at any stage of the food production or distribution process 
has the potential to devastatingly impact one of a nation’s most valuable economic and 
infrastructural resources – its agricultural sector. Agroterrorism has been identified as an 
increasing threat due to the implications of halting agricultural development, which accounts for 
approximately one-third of global gross domestic product (World Bank, 2018). Examples in 
recent history include a forty percent decrease in Israeli citrus exports during the 1970s due to 
contamination of Jaffa oranges with mercury, as well as a 200-million dollar trade loss in 1989 
due to cyanide contamination of grapes in Chile (Alekseeva et al., 2017). It is projected that an 
agroterror attack on livestock alone could cause 10-30 billion USD in damage to the economy 
(Alekseeva et al., 2017). 
The diversity of agroterrorism threats poses a challenge to food defense efforts for 
multiple reasons. First, plant pathogens can range from bacteria, viruses, fungi or protozoa to 
insects or non-native plant species (Green et al., 2017). Pathogenic and parasitic organisms are 
naturally responsible for 20–40% yield loss globally (Das et al., 2019); thus, the impact of 
deliberate crop infection would result in devastating consequences for consumers. Secondly, 
plant, animal, or human mortality may be the objective, or an attack may be implemented with 
the additional purpose of undermining social stability, holding a nation economically hostage, 
and causing general loss of confidence in the government (Olson, 2012). Human morbidity and 
mortality has traditionally been attributed to the dissemination of toxins or bacterial pathogens 
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such as Clostridium botulinum, Escherichia coli, and Salmonella enterica via the food 
production and distribution chain (Olson, 2012). However, longer-lasting economic crises may 
be generated by the infection of plants or animals with disease-causing agents in order to 
drastically decrease availability of food resources either for domestic consumption or export. 
Agroterrorism is not only a threat to primary production (upstream) elements of the food chain 
such as farming, but may occur through imported foods which may be contaminated with 
pathogens or insect vectors prior to arriving at a port of entry (Gill, 2015). This particular type of 
bioterrorism has been labeled as “low tech, but high impact” (Green et al., 2017, p. 33) with a 
high potential for effectiveness due to its low risk for the perpetrator, lack of recognition by 
agricultural and scientific communities worldwide, and resemblance to natural outbreaks.  
Threat Assessment 
The threat level of agroterrorism is related to the goal of active terrorist cells on the 
international scene. Organizations which hope to destabilize nations for political or religious gain 
may consider strategies involving agroterrorism and should warrant monitoring via cooperative 
effort between the scientific, agricultural, and intelligence communities. In the past, 
agroterrorism has not elicited the same level of concern as suicide bombings and mass shootings. 
This is due to the fact that these methods of attack pose a more imminent threat to the immediate 
safety of citizens and have been the traditionally preferred tactics of terrorist organizations for 
decades. However, Gill (2015) notes that the use of bioterror agents must not be overlooked, as 
this approach is more practical than the use of explosives. Biological agents are often naturally-
occurring in the environment or require only a limited microbiological background in order to 
culture in a laboratory; additionally, these organisms are not as readily detectable by technology 
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as other weapons of terror (Gill, 2015). Minimal infective doses result in ease of concealment for 
certain pathogenic agents, and the incubation time of many viruses enables terrorists to vacate 
the scene to avoid implication or infection (Alekseeva et al., 2017). Another benefit to 
agroterrorists is the lack of detection methods for pathogenic microorganisms before symptoms 
show (Alekseeva et al., 2017). Zamir (2016) notes that phytosanitary certificates are often 
granted based on visual evaluation of plant health; this becomes a major concern when dealing 
with fungi which produce spores which may be carried by plants but do not necessarily cause 
disease symptoms. Another problem revolves around the assumption that target hosts will be 
taxonomically related to plants affected in the country of origin, which does not account for the 
fact that hitchhiking pathogens may find a much more tolerable environment in the place they 
end up, resulting in an unexpected host range (Zamir, 2016). As international commerce in mail-
ordered seeds and plants grows (Zamir, 2016), this becomes an increasing concern. Thus, 
agroterrorism is dangerous and damaging in its simplicity, providing a less expensive and less 
technical method of maximizing impact radius and longevity.  
Concern over the use of anti-crop weapons by certain aggressor nations arose in the late 
1980s over evidence that Iraq was acquiring the military capacity to destroy Iranian crops via 
research and development of Tilletia caries, T. tritici and aflatoxin-producing strains of the 
fungus Aspergillus (Suffert et al., 2009). Islamic terrorist organizations al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
are known to have contemplated the use of agroterrorism through the weaponization of wheat 
rust (Suffert et al., 2009), documenting the potential impact of an agricultural terror attack on the 
United States economy (Gill, 2015). Olson notes that this is consistent with the “death by a 
thousand cuts” strategy (2012, para. 10), which seeks to “exhaust, overwhelm, and distract U.S. 
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Department of Homeland Security forces… by flooding America’s already information-
overloaded intelligence systems with myriad threats and background noise” (2012, para. 10). 
Agroterrorism may thus be used independently or as a form of enhancement when coordinated 
with other attacks, which could include cyberterrorism or smaller, individual bombings (Olson, 
2012). According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), plant pathogens could be 
introduced through the food supply chain at various vulnerable entry points (2011). Several risk 
factors which have been identified include geographical and operational concentration, long-term 
and insecure storage, reduced isolation, reliance on artificial pest control, and lack of genetic 
diversity (Green et al., 2017). Historically, the global threat of agroterrorism was limited by poor 
transportation and technical skill; however, the development of agroterrorism as a viable threat 
has coincided with the expansion and general availability of scientific knowledge and techniques 
(Alekseeva et al., 2017). A potential force multiplier is the cultivation of genetically modified 
strains for which vaccines or treatment therapies do not yet exist. Terrorists with adequate 
funding and biological knowledge have the ability to engineer resistant strains of plant viruses, 
enhance toxicity or virulence factors, or acquire experimental species to achieve maximum 
damage in the event of an attack. Because the majority of risk assessments are based on 
organisms already known to cause damage, novel aggressive pathogens may not be properly 
identified by the international community – despite the fact that ninety percent of the threat is 
linked to such unidentified agents (Zamir, 2016).  
Survey of Plant Pathogens  
High on the watch-list for plant pathogens are fungal diseases such as wheat smut, rice 
blast, brown stripe mildew (corn), and karnal bunt (wheat); fungal spores are also a concern, as 
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they are naturally disseminated through the air and undergo an incubation period during which 
they are relatively undetectable by workers on the ground (FAS, 2011). Certain bioaerosols such 
as rust spores can be transported kilometers into the atmosphere, across continents, and may even 
be spread by air streamlines around falling raindrops (Kim et al., 2019). Because of this natural 
propensity to spread due to simple fluctuations in weather phenomena such as rain or wind, 
fungal agents have been effectively used as infectious agents in the past. As mentioned 
previously, Saddam Hussein used cannisters to disperse the wheat smut pathogen over Iranian 
fields during the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s (FAS, 2011). Additionally, fungal toxins – 
including those that cause damage to plants directly and those which contaminate harvested 
foods and impact the health of consumers – are a significant threat to the public as well as the 
agriculture industry. One particular example is aflatoxin, a known carcinogen which binds DNA 
and proteins (Anderson, 2012). Aflatoxins, produced by the fungi Aspergillus flavus and 
parasiticus, could serve as a particularly panic-inducing bioweapon, due to long-term 
consequences to public health. Plant virology is another particularly impactful discipline on the 
study of agroterrorism, as genetic advancements continue to be made that grant potential 
agroterrorists the opportunity to develop new viral strains with no readily available therapy. Plant 
virus infectious clones are a potential threat due to their inherent pathogenicity and the impact of 
introduced genetic modifications (Brewer et al., 2018). Furthermore, bacterial plant pathology 
identifies organisms such as Ralstonia solanacearum, Agrobacterium tumefaciens, Xanthomonas 
oryzae pv. oryzae, and Xylella fastidiosa as top threats to staple crops. For each of these 
biological agents, consideration must be given to virulence, length of incubation period, 
available therapies, and pathogen resistance factors. The Risk Evaluation Scheme (RES) devised 
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by Suffert et al. (2009) includes thirty-five fungal, nine bacterial, and six viral agents as 
candidates for agroterror activities and notes that thirty-two out of the fifty would cause direct 
crop loss to staple food crops, forest trees, industrial and market crops, and orchards.  
Economic and Social Impact 
 It is vital to note the expected economic and social impact of a potential agroterror attack 
in order to develop thorough and efficient preparedness strategies. Historically, plant disease has 
precipitated ecological and social damage as evidenced by high mortality and migration rates 
(Velásquez et al., 2018). Perhaps the most infamous case was the Irish potato famine of the 
1840s, caused by the fungus-like organism Phytophthora infestans, in which over a million 
individuals died of starvation or disease resulting from the infection of Ireland’s primary food 
source (DoChara, 2008). While modern societies are not reliant on monoculture, measures must 
still be taken to enhance the resistance of food crops essential for human nutrition. With an 
increasingly global society, national economies are intimately connected to the world market. 
Gill (2015) specifies that agroterrorism is not “flashy” (p. 10); while it may not produce the 
shock value of a bombing or other tactic, its use as economic sabotage will result in fear, 
instability, and loss of life and investments, including “heritage and environmental loss which 
may have psychological effects on populations” (Suffert et al., 2017, 225). Statistically, 1 in 6 
jobs in the United States is linked to agriculture (Olson, 2012). Thus, it is vital to remember that 
an attack would not only inflict economic hardship on individuals working within the agriculture 
industry, but would inevitably spiral outward to impact the rest of the nation; the severity of the 
effects would depend on the type of pathogen.  
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In the recent past, analysts expressed concern that groups such as al-Qaeda would adopt 
tactics utilizing agroterrorism due to a “highly favorable cost-benefit ratio” (FAS, 2011, Section 
6, para. 2); however, more recently the concern has shifted to include economic opportunists, 
domestic terrorists (including lone wolves and disgruntled employees), as well as militant animal 
rights groups (Gill, 2015). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) notes the extent of 
economic and social damage which an agroterrorism attack could inflict, particularly on the 
United States: 
[These include] direct losses due to containment measures, such as stop-movement orders 
(SMOs)… [and] indirect multiplier effects, such as compensation to farmers for 
destruction of agricultural commodities and losses suffered by directly and indirectly 
related industries… International costs would result from protective trade embargoes. 
Less measurable consequences would include the undermining of confidence in and 
support of government, creation of social panic, and threat to public health on the 
national and global levels. (Olson, 2012, para. 14)  
An example of the economic devastation which can result from even a benign food issue 
can be found in the Korean beef riots of summer 2008. Rallies against U.S. beef imports resulted 
in demonstrations involving thousands of citizens and is credited with undermining the recently 
elected administration of South Korea (Green et al., 2017). The likelihood of food shortage 
resulting from disruption of the food supply is compounded in urban areas, as supermarkets only 
stock a week’s supply of food with the expectation for arrival of a timely shipment (Olson, 
2012). The panic and rioting which would occur as a result of a successful agroterror attack and 
subsequent food shortage cannot be overstated.  In the event of a large-scale attack, the resulting 
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economic and social upheaval has been projected to cause extensive, long-term damage with 
more persistent consequences than most traditional tactics, such as suicide bombing. 
Consequently, agricultural losses are considered a primary obstacle to global food security for a 
growing population (Velásquez et al., 2018). Plant disease poses a threat due to the longevity of 
infection; whereas a biological toxin or chemical contaminant may be isolated quickly and the 
affected food products destroyed, infection at the source impacts growth and harvesting of 
cultivated crops fundamental to food security.  
Prevention and Preparedness Measures 
Olson (2012) notes the importance of involving law enforcement agencies in the counter-
agroterrorism objective, as warning signs such as theft of vaccines, medicines, and agricultural 
equipment may be preliminary warning signs of an agroterror attack. Integral to threat-mitigation 
is cooperation not only amongst law enforcement and intelligence agencies, but also between the 
agricultural and scientific communities. This includes involvement and proper incident reporting 
by farm workers and first responders such as private and state veterinarians, phytologists, police, 
extension agents, and local authority contingency planners (Green et al., 2017). A major tenet of 
the preemptive legislation implemented by the United States government hinges on the 
cooperation of multiple agencies including the Department of Health, Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (Hunter 2015). The challenge for agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has been the shift of perspective from food safety to food defense (Gill, 2015); while the 
former is primarily focused on preventing contamination, the latter focuses on preemptive 
strategies for protecting the ingredients of human food or animal feed. Furthermore, the 
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importance of differentiating between accidental and deliberate attacks must be understood; 
scenario-based training exercises have been effective in the United States to streamline the 
process of engaging both the USDA (for containment and restoration) and law enforcement (for 
investigation and evidence gathering) in the event of an attack. Classical epidemiological 
methodology as well as the application of forensic science, in which scientific knowledge and 
technology provide evidence in possible violations of law, is essential (Suffert et al., 2009). 
Research facilities have been identified as potential points of entry, and the threat includes 
failure to maintain security at such locations due to mild disagreements between advocates for 
freedom of research and national security officials (Suffert et al., 2009). Recommendations have 
included use of molecular-based detection strategies for early detection and identification of 
plant pathogens in order to flag the emergence of epidemics deemed suspicious and the creation 
of nationwide diagnostic networks (Suffert et al., 2009). One counter-agroterror tactic adopted 
by the United Kingdom is the establishment of international trade links to alternative food 
sources (Green et al., 2017). This strategy is projected to alleviate a food shortage in the event of 
a crisis and may be integral to the survival of developing nations in the event of an agroterror 
attack. However, it cannot be relied upon as a primary protective policy for nations such as the 
United States, which are among the top producers of the world’s food crops. 
Achievement of crop biosecurity has been attempted by quarantine and phytosanitary 
regulations enacted by organizations such as the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC), which strives to harmonize efforts to prevent the introduction of exotic plant pests in 
various nations (Suffert et al., 2009). The importance of countering illegal transportation of plant 
products across national borders by the establishment of biosecurity checkpoints has been noted 
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(Jaspal and Khan, 2017), and as recently as October 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives 
recommended the Protecting America’s Food and Agriculture Act to the Committee on 
Homeland Security and the Committee on Agriculture. The act states that, “It is in the national 
security interest of the United States to ensure that the Nation’s food supply is sufficiently 
protected…[through] the availability of adequate resources at the border to conduct inspections 
of incoming food and agricultural goods” (S. 2107, 2019). An increased number of Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) Agriculture Specialists and support staff within the Office of Field 
Operations is proposed, as is a comprehensive review of the coordinated efforts between 
associated federal agencies to address risks to the agricultural supply, including inspection of 
agricultural commodities entering the United States and the training provided to CBP Agriculture 
Specialists. This type of preventative measure would be complemented by foodborne outbreak 
emergency exercises such as Norway’s Stella Polaris exercise involving local, regional, and 
national units over a several-day period; this nation-wide training exercise has been credited with 
high levels of learning concerning general and specific contingency plans (Wahl et al., 2015). 
The Stella Polaris exercise highlighted the necessity of crisis communication (including media 
handling) as an integrated element in functional emergency exercises, as findings indicated that 
personnel felt ill-equipped to handle the media aspect of emergency response (Wahl et al., 2015). 
Research also suggests that lack of public awareness, particularly within academia, remains a 
roadblock to food defense efforts. Jaspal and Khan (2017) recommend addressing this issue 
through increased emphasis on plant biosecurity, rather than simply bioterrorism, within life 
science curriculums. 
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Overview of Innate Immunological Defense Mechanisms 
While the immune system of vertebrates – particularly animals and humans – has been 
studied extensively at the molecular level, that of plants has remained an enigma until recent 
years. With such growing concern surrounding the agriculture industry due to the potential for 
terroristic threats, research concerning the defense mechanisms that innately exist within plants 
has been conducted to determine how best to protect valuable food resources. Macho and Zipfel 
(2014) note that for survival, the plant immune system must have the capacity to respond to 
biotic or abiotic and internal or external stimuli simultaneously at the cellular, tissue, and organ 
level. However, due to their sessile nature, plants differ from other living organisms in the 
manner by which they must defend against pathogenic bacteria, viruses, and fungi. Unlike 
humans and animals, plants do not have the capability to mount an adaptive immune response to 
foreign invaders and lack specialized mobile immune cells; instead, plants rely on the innate 
immune capability of individual cells and systemic signaling from infection sites (Jones and 
Dangl, 2006).  
Two main types of immunity exist within the plant kingdom – constitutive and inducible, 
with the latter further branching into pattern-triggered immunity (PTI) and effector-triggered 
immunity (ETI). These responses work simultaneously to provide the most efficient and 
effective immunity possible to the organism. Various systemic responses may also be engaged in 
the event of pathogen invasion; these responses are named according to the method of induced 
immune response. Despite lacking the capability to develop an acquired response, plants do 
maintain their own form of immunological memory through defense priming – which falls under 
the inducible response and can be either naturally or artificially induced – as well as heritable 
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systemic immunity. Thus, when considering how to best protect crops from both natural disease 
and sabotage, methods of boosting the innate immunity and systemic signaling capabilities of 
individual organisms must be considered.  
Constitutive Immunity 
Plants, much like humans, contain a first-line of defense against microbial infection. 
Similar to the epidermis, most plants maintain a waxy cuticle surrounding their shoot (the above-
ground portion of the plant). In perennials, this is known as the periderm and consists of non-
living cork cells (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016). This layer poses the first line of defense 
for potential pathogens and requires specific environmental and virulence factors to overcome. 
This constitutive defense mechanism as well as the synthesis and accumulation of phytoalexins, 
glucosinolates, and other secondary metabolites (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016) make up 
what is known as Non-host Resistance (NHR), a pre-invasion immunological defense system 
that is the most prevalent form of plant immunity. Studies in Arabidopsis thaliana have shown 
that plasma membrane-localized ATP-binding cassette (ABC) transporter PEN3 
and myrosinase PEN2 interact in some manner to export antimicrobial secondary metabolites 
and confer constitutive immunity (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016). Another aspect of 
NHR is formation of cell wall appositions via a Soluble NSF Attachment Protein Receptor 
(SNARE) complex formed by the PEN1syntaxin which engages in vesicle secretion at the site of 
fungal invasions (Jones and Dangl, 2006).  
Inducible Immunity 
The inducible aspect of plant immunity may be classified as either pattern-triggered 
Immunity (PTI) or effector-triggered immunity (ETI), depending on the type of response 
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initiated (Li et al., 2016). PTI (Figure 1A) occurs when pattern-recognition receptors (PRRs) 
located at the cell surface (Macho and Zipfel, 2014) recognize microbe-associated molecular 
patterns (MAMPs). These may be either infectious non-self determinants or self-molecules 
known as damage-associated molecular patterns released upon pathogen perception or induced 
cell damage (Macho and Zipfel, 2014). Multiprotein complexes at the plasma membrane contain 
PRRs as well as additional transmembrane and cytosolic kinases necessary for both initiation and 
specificity of immune signaling, regulated by protein phosphatases and E3 ligases (Macho and 
Zipfel, 2014). While this is similar to innate immunity in vertebrates, the main differences 
revolve around the multiplicity of PRRs – compared to the limited number required in animals to 
recognize more highly conserved PAMPs – as well as the lack of intracellular PRRs found in 
plants (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016). However, this response has been shown to be 
incredibly complex, involving co-receptors, negative regulators, substrates linking PRR 
activation to the induction of early signaling components, and initiation of signaling via 
phosphorylation (Macho and Zipfel, 2014). Li et al. (2016) note that a cascade of 
phosphorylation from MAPK to transcription factors is needed for instantaneous transduction of 
MAMP signals to transcriptional machinery, and that this process is the major governing factor 
of the transcriptional selectivity of primary immune genes. PTI is often all that is needed to halt 
further colonization and is deployed against all types of microorganisms, whether infectious or 
not (Jones and Dangl, 2006). PTI works through various MAMP/PRR interactions; the most 
prominent of these include activation of FLAGELLIN-SENSING2 (FLS2), a leucine-rich repeat 
receptor kinase (LRR-RK), by the flg22 amino acid sequence as well as recognition of bacterial 
elongation factor Tu and subsequent EF-Tu/EFR pairing (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016; 
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Macho and Zipfel, 2014). Fungi also contain MAMPs that result in pairing, such as fungal 
chitin/CERK1, studied in Arabidopsis (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016). These 
MAMP/receptor kinase pairings result in downstream cellular defense signaling (Reimer-
Michalski and Conrath, 2016) that is known to cause reactive oxygen species (ROS) release, 
mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPK) activation, plant hormone synthesis and signaling, 
metabolic changes, excessive transcriptional reprogramming, and the expression of immune-
related genes (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016; Macho and Zipfel, 2014). In fact, MAMP 
perception has been demonstrated to induce approximately one thousand genes within an hour 
after exposure (Li et al., 2016). Macho and Zipfel (2014) conclude that the biological importance 
of this primary immune defense is emphasized by the necessity of evasion or suppression by an 
adapted pathogen in order for disease to occur. 
In some cases, a pathogenic microorganism possesses certain virulence factors which 
enable it to avoid recognition and binding by PRRs. These virulence factors are known as 
effector molecules and are released into the plant cell (Jones and Dangl, 2006). This stimulates 
ETI (Figure 1C) via direct or indirect recognition by Resistance (R) proteins (Reimer-Michalski 
and Conrath, 2016) and nucleotide-binding oligomerization domain-like receptors (NLRs) within 
the cell (Macho and Zipfel, 2014). The guard hypothesis is used to describe this immune 
function, in which so called “watchdog” R proteins (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016) 
monitor cellular protein integrity and note structural changes due to effector molecules and may 
then initiate the hypersensitive cell death response (HR), a form of programmed cell death. An 
NB-LRR protein recognizes the particular effector which has invaded the plant cell, resulting in 
a next-level response stronger and more efficient than PTI and similar to the Apaf-1 induced 
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proximity mechanism of apoptosis in animal cells (Jones and Dangl, 2006). This occurs only as a 
means of ridding the plant of the infected cell; it has not been shown to specifically impact 
pathogen growth in any case other than haustorial parasites (Jones and Dangl, 2006).  
Systemic Immunity 
A localized infection, if not deterred by inducible defenses, either induces the 
hypersensitive response or results in disease symptoms (Figure 1B). When this occurs, a 
different type of immunity is engaged; systemic acquired resistance (SAR) defends against 
reinfection throughout the entirety of the organism, up to the entire lifespan of the plant. It also is 
a heritable trait (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016). Another type of systemic immunity is 
known as induced systemic resistance (ISR) which is activated specifically by root-colonizing or 
necrotizing bacteria and fungi (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016). Wound-induced resistance 
(WIR), which involves a buildup of protease inhibitors responsible for preventing insect 
digestion of plant material (amongst other things), can defend against microbes or external pests. 
Thus, this type of immunity typically occurs during infestation of some kind – either for feeding 
or egg deposition purposes (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016) – but is also noted in physical 
injury to the plant. Other environmental conditions, such as metabolic disturbances, can also 
induce forms of systemic immunity. Reimer-Michalski and Conrath note that SAR and ISR are 
the immune responses with the greatest promise for sustainable agriculture due to their broad-
spectrum activity and lack of negative effects on overall plant fitness (2016); however, the 
researchers also note that alterations to primary metabolism in tubers and leaves have aided in 
the prevention of future infection by organisms such as Pectobacterium atrosepticum (soft-rot), 
Alternaria solani (early blight), and Phytophthora infestans (late blight). Due to the manner by 
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which SAR and similar forms of systemic immunity function in plants, their likely applications 
in agriculture are related to regular fluctuations in environmental and growing conditions. When 
considering methods for combating agroterrorism, optimizing inducible immunity such as PTI or 
ETI, or perhaps even preventing invasion of the pathogen completely through artificial boosting 
of constitutive immunity are better options to explore. Following colonization and the 
appearance of symptoms, even in the event of recovery and development of systemic immunity 
to prevent infection of future crops, damage for the current growing season may be inevitable.  
 
Figure 1. A visual representation of the molecular activity resulting from (A) pattern or PAMP-
triggered immunity, (B) infection by a plant pathogen, and (C) effector-triggered immunity (Van 
de Wouw and Idnurm, 2019). 
 
Defense Priming 
 
The memory aspect of plant immunity does not come in the form of mobile, specialized 
function cells with the sole purpose of mounting an improved response upon reinfection. Instead, 
a system of high alert is maintained within both the exposed tissues as well as the uninfected 
regions in a plant after initial stimulation of the immune system; a good analogy would be a 
country which spends resources building up defense technology (plants) versus one which 
maintains a small standing army (vertebrates). Defense priming is defined as the aspect of 
inducible plant immunity which influences response to reinfection or abiotic stress via 
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recognition of MAMPs, herbivore-associated molecular patterns, DAMPs, pathogen effectors, or 
certain xenobiotics (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016). A memory response is created by the 
modification of histones (H3K4me3), demethylation of DNA in defense gene promoters, 
increase of PRRs and coreceptors in the cell membrane, and enhanced levels of dormant MPKs. 
Defense priming thus provides a similar primed innate response to that of mammals, providing a 
long-lasting epigenetic memory (Reimer-Michalski and Conrath, 2016). 
Reimer-Michalski and Conrath (2016) note that defense priming is particularly effective in 
perennials and has been shown to have a more positive impact on the inducible immune response 
than the accumulation of antimicrobial proteins that can be activated in plants by treatment with 
SA, Pip, (Me)JA, AzA, and certain xenobiotics in stress-free scenarios in such a manner as to 
only minorly impact plant fitness. A continuing problem identified by researchers studying food 
security and defense is the reliance on artificial pest control and a lack of genetic diversity in 
crops (Green et al., 2017). Jones and Dangl (2006) view defense priming as an opportunity to 
translate knowledge of the plant immune system to practice, utilizing molecular techniques to 
address such concerns and improve sustainable agriculture and food defense measures; 
implementation of their suggestions on a wider scale is perhaps one method of combating plant 
pathogens.  
Biotechnology and Sustainable Agriculture 
The immune capability of plants may not consist of an acquired response, yet plant 
immunology is far from a simplistic topic. Looking to the future, further study of the molecular 
mechanisms behind plant immunity – particularly, transcriptional regulation in pattern-triggered 
immunity and controlled defense priming – should be considered, with experimental projects 
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evaluating the validity of artificial induction of innate defenses. Due to the development of an 
increasingly global society, a novel approach to food defense and biosecurity is needed to protect 
both world markets and individual consumers of agricultural products. Thus, plant breeding 
programs should focus on incorporating “abiotic tolerance, growth, and biotic resistance 
variability that favor plant immunity and disfavor pathogen virulence” (Velásquez et al., 2018, p. 
R628). Many researchers argue that the scientific community should be at the forefront of 
biosecurity initiatives, focusing on offensive breeding efforts rather than defensive policing 
measures. One proposed solution is an internationally coordinated effort to enhance biodiversity 
(Zamir, 2016) through a network of sites collaborating on the sequencing of plant and pathogen 
genomes to determine genetic markers and a cloud-based network integrating such genetic 
information with global distribution.  This hybridization project would require partnerships 
between state-sponsored and private academic institutions already invested in plant genomics, 
informatics, seed storage, and biodiversity education (Zamir, 2016). Current research centers on 
boosting host resistance through a variety of methods including targeted genome editing, 
stimulation of host resistance genes with antiviral activity, activation of autophagy, and synthesis 
and utilization of bacteriocins. 
Resistance Selection 
One of the most promising strategies for developing host resistance in market crops is the 
artificial activation of resistance genes associated with PTI or ETI. While plant genome 
sequencing to determine the specific genes active during an infection has been successfully 
performed, this task can be made much simpler by the study of pathogen effector molecules 
recognized by these genes (Van de Wouw and Idnurm, 2019). Effector molecules have been 
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utilized to guide breeding of resistance genes and trigger defense responses within plants 
infected by fungi or oomycetes, and the success of such biotechnology should encourage the use 
of effector molecules to study diseases across a wider range of plant-pathogen interactions (Van 
de Wouw and Idnurm, 2019). The use of genetically modified crops in this analysis is an 
invaluable tool, as transgenic creation of resistance genes rather than the slower traditional 
method of cross-breeding saves time and enables resistance selection in crops incapable of 
conventional breeding; it also prevents the reduction in yield and fitness often observed in 
selection of genetic resistance, a phenomenon known as linkage drag (Van de Wouw and 
Idnurm, 2019). A recent study by Xu et al. (2017) explored engineered resistance in relation to 
fitness cost (i.e., the ability to replicate and survive in a competitive environment) by studying 
Arabidopsis thaliana and the AtNPR1 gene. The researchers determined that tighter control of 
defense protein translation triggers the TBF1-casette, consisting of the promoter as well as two 
upstream open reading frames (uORFsTBF1) of the TBF1 gene. TBF1 is responsible for switching 
the organism from growth-related activities to defense-related translation, and the cost to benefit 
ratio of this method remains favorable both in the laboratory and the field (Xu et al., 2017).  
A potential problem with targeting resistance (R) genes in plants infected with viruses, 
bacteria, or fungi is the corresponding development of resistance in pathogen species. Das et al. 
(2019) note a necessary shift in focus from targeting R genes to editing S genes, also known as 
host susceptibility factors. Use of the CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing system (Figure 2) has garnered 
attention in plant genome modification due to its efficiency and cost-effectiveness, which is 
unattainable by traditional breeding methods. Additionally, this aspect of biotechnology requires 
only a single guide RNA (sgRNA) to provide target-site specificity; it also allows for multiplex 
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genome editing or targeting several genes with one construct (Xu et al., 2017). Although the 
CRISPR-Cas9 system has been utilized in the study of engineered plant resistance, further 
developments must be made before its broader implementation. Minor errors from off-targeting 
as well as bioethical concerns have kept CRISPR-Cas9 products from being widely disseminated 
in the real world (Xu et al., 2017), which is why continued study of the longevity and fitness of 
organisms with CRISPR-engineered resistance in the field is necessary to improve current 
agricultural defense mechanisms (Van de Wouw and Idnurm, 2019). 
 
Figure 2. The CRISPR-Cas9 system for genome editing  
and engineering of plant resistance utilizes a single guide  
RNA (Das et al., 2019). 
 
Host Antiviral Activity 
Resistance to plant viruses may be engineered through gene editing. It has been 
determined that antiviral defense mechanisms are mediated by host factors which target viral 
nucleic acids and proteins through autophagy, proteasome degradation, RNA decay and gene 
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silencing (Garcia-Ruiz, 2018). Antiviral gene silencing recognizes viral RNA through formation 
of hairpin structures, replication intermediates, and overlapping transcriptional products and 
targets these single-stranded RNAs for degradation or translational repression (Garcia-Ruiz, 
2018), resulting in a plant’s recovery from viral symptoms due to the inability of the virus to 
replicate its genome or mobilize. Another opposite approach involves the identification of host 
pro-viral factors, or the characterization of genes which make a plant susceptible to pathogenic 
infection. Genome editing is still necessary utilizing this method; however, rather than targeting 
the virus, a focus on host pro-viral factors transforms a permissive host into a non-host through 
inactivation of susceptibility genes (Garcia-Ruiz, 2018). Although this has proven effective in 
preventing infection and viral replication, certain challenges do exist – particularly, whether or 
not the pro-viral factor is an essential gene required for host survival. Garcia-Ruiz notes that 
viruses such as orthotospoviruses, potyviruses, tobamoviruses and geminiviruses which cause 
plant diseases in staple crops such as maize and sugarcane will likely receive more attention in 
the near future through a combination of genome editing and epitope-tagging of viral proteins 
(Garcia-Ruiz, 2018). This would streamline the process of determining host genes which display 
antiviral as well as pro-viral characteristics for the adoption of a synergistic approach to 
developing viral resistance. 
Antimicrobial Peptides 
 Secondary bacterial metabolites of the Bacillus species (Figure 3) have proven to be 
successful antimicrobial substances. Nonribosomally-synthesized peptides and lipopeptides 
displaying antagonistic properties against invading species have been utilized as natural 
alternatives to chemical pesticides and are a simpler defense mechanism than genetic engineering 
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(Fira et al., 2018). Certain species such as Bacillus subtilis or Bacillus amyloliquefaciens FZB42 
utilize 4-8% of their genome for the synthesis of dozens of such antimicrobial peptides, and other 
strains produce secondary metabolites which not only impede pathogen growth but also contain 
growth-promoting properties for the plants with which they associate (Fira et al., 2018). The 
process of antibiosis occurs when the small, heat stable, amphiphilic proteins that characterize 
non-ribosomal peptides interact with the envelope of an invading cell, leading to its demise by 
osmotic imbalance caused by induced pore and ion channel formation (Fira et al., 2018). Most 
studies involving bacteriocins have focused on elucidating their antifungal effect against genera 
such as Fusarium; these peptides show great promise in biological control over fungal 
phytopathogens. Fungitoxic activity usually involves permeabilization of spores or conidia 
causing damage to the membrane resulting in the inhibition of germination or hyphal cell 
perturbation (Fira et al., 2018). A particularly interesting interaction is that between Bacillus 
species and plant growth-promoting (PGP) rhizobacteria, which can induce systemic immunity 
or synthesis of bacteriocins as well as more positive growth-promoting effects; these include 
synthesis of phytohormones and facilitation of absorption and utilization of certain mineral 
nutrients (Fira et al., 2018). However, more research is needed on control of bacterial pathogens 
in this manner, and antimicrobial lipopeptides have no effect on viral strains (Fira et al., 2018). 
Regardless, the use of biotechnology to isolate or even construct strains which possess biocontrol 
mechanisms such as antimicrobial lipopeptides as well as plant growth promotion factors is a 
defense strategy which focuses on marketability of products to growers. Streamlining of the 
isolation or manufacturing processes to make these products readily available is a worthy focus 
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for the scientific community when considering strategies for combating the malevolent use of 
plant pathogens.  
 
Figure 3. A compilation of cyclic and linear non-ribosomally synthesized peptides containing 
antimicrobial characteristics; these molecules may be utilized in biosecurity plans intended to 
prevent fungal invasion of staple crops (Fira et al., 2018). 
Autophagy 
Plant resistance may also be impacted by the activation of autophagy, as several factors 
correspond with viral clearance upon induction of the autophagic response. For example, viral 
particles are frequently found in vacuoles; this supports the idea that there must be an active 
process that is removing these viruses from the cell (Clavel et al., 2017). An ATG8 protein 
required for autophagosome formation within the cell was found as an interactor with a virulence 
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factor of the Cotton Leaf Curl Multan virus and upregulation of genes known to be associated 
with autophagy, such as NBR1 (Clavel et al., 2017). Activation of autophagy has been shown to 
enhance resistance to DNA-containing viruses not only by the formation of autosomes, but also 
through enhanced autophagic flux and degradation of the capsid protein and viral particles 
(Clavel et al., 2017). 
Conclusion 
 Attack on agricultural development is a terroristic activity which has existed throughout 
history as a cause of socioeconomic upheaval and drastic reduction in resources for affected 
nations. The threat of plant-based agroterrorism continues to grow as the ability of terror 
organizations to mount expensive, technologically advanced attacks declines due to elimination 
of leadership and successful counter-terrorism policies. Increase in scientific capability and 
broader access to information concerning molecular biological techniques and microbial 
culturing directly relates to the unique threat posed by agroterrorism and needs to be addressed 
within multiple segments of society. As with any counter-terrorism initiative, involvement of the 
community is vital to the success of prevention measures. The agricultural and scientific 
industries are in a unique position to aid intelligence and law enforcement agencies through 
proper recognition of threats and developments within biotechnology to engineer plant resistance 
to common and novel plant pathogens. Although the multitudinous steps required to get from 
seed to table provide a myriad of entry points for infectious agents, proper awareness and 
implementation of plant resistance strategies will lead to enhanced economic security for 
humanity’s agricultural resources. 
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